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 ABSTRACT 
 
Bitcoin is a decentralized peer-to-peer electronic cash system that allows any           
two willing parties to transact directly without the need for a trusted third party. The               
user's funds are protected by private keys that must be kept safe, preferably not on               
third party wallet services, but on hardware wallets, which are the best balance             
between very high security and ease of use. In this work we made a review on                
cryptography, the Bitcoin protocol and secure elements, then we dived into the            
project of hardware wallets, discussing different requirements and ways to construct           
one. Our proposed device uses an anti tamper Java Card to store the private keys.               
We considered variations of the device, one with a dedicated touchscreen and            
another with NFC to integrate with a mobile phone. We analyzed security aspects of              
the project, made recommendations and described some challenges. Finally, we          
implemented our own open source prototype, showing the architecture of the project,            
its components, the requirements, the APDU communication protocol and the results. 
 
Keywords: Hardware wallet; Bitcoin; Software and hardware integration;        
Smart Card.  
  
8 
 SUMMARY 
APPRECIATION ​​6 
ABSTRACT ​​8 
SUMMARY ​​9 
1. INTRODUCTION ​​13 
1.1. OBJECTIVES ​15 
1.1.1. MAIN OBJECTIVE ​15 
1.1.2. SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES ​15 
1.2. EXPECTED RESULTS ​15 
1.3. STRUCTURE OF THIS WORK ​15 
2. FUNDAMENTALS ​​17 
2.1. CRYPTOGRAPHY ​17 
2.1.1. Cryptographic Hash Functions ​17 
2.1.2. SHA ​17 
2.1.3. RIPEMD ​18 
2.1.4. HMAC ​18 
2.1.5. PBKDF2 ​19 
2.1.6. Asymmetric cryptography ​19 
2.1.7. Digital signatures ​20 
2.1.8. ECDSA ​20 
2.2. BITCOIN ​21 
2.2.1. Blockchain and mining ​23 
2.2.2. Transactions and authentication ​24 
2.3. KEYS MANAGEMENT, ADDRESSES AND WALLETS ​26 
2.3.1. Bitcoin wallets ​26 
2.3.2. Address generation ​26 
2.3.3. Deterministic generation of wallets ​28 
2.3.4. Seed phrase for recovering the master key ​30 
2.3.5. Hot and cold wallets ​30 
2.3.6. A note on the Bitfi hardware wallet ​32 
2.4. SECURE ELEMENT ​32 
2.4.1. Anti-tamper and certification ​33 
2.4.2. Java Card ​34 
2.4.3. APDU ​35 
2.4.4. Global Platform ​36 
2.5. RELATED WORK ​37 
2.5.1. Low-Level Attacks in Bitcoin Wallets ​37 
2.5.2. SRP on Java Card applets ​38 
2.5.3. Usability analysis on wallets ​39 
3. DEVELOPMENT ​​41 
3.1. Different possibilities for the hardware wallet ​41 
3.1.1. Smart Card + Connection ​42 
3.1.2. Basic requirements ​43 
3.1.3. Limitations ​44 
3.1.4. Smart Card + Connection + Microcontroller ​44 
3.1.5. Smart Card + Connection + Microcontroller + Buttons + Screen ​45 
3.1.6. Additional basic requirements (smart card) ​46 
3.1.7. Basic requirements (microcontroller) ​47 
3.1.8. Limitations ​47 
3.1.9. Smart Card + Connection + Powerful Microcontroller + Buttons + Big screen +             
Internet access ​48 
3.1.10. Smart Card + Connection (NFC) + Mobile Phone ​48 
3.1.11. Limitations ​49 
3.2. Security considerations ​49 
9 
 3.2.1. Communication channel ​49 
3.2.2. PIN entering ​50 
3.2.3. Device personalization ​52 
3.2.4. Plausible deniability and wipe PIN ​53 
3.2.5. Hardware level protection ​54 
3.2.6. Attestation of genuineness ​55 
3.3. Prototype ​56 
3.3.1. Overview of the architecture ​56 
3.3.2. Main requirements ​58 
3.3.3. Hardware wallet ​58 
3.3.4. Connector ​59 
3.3.5. Wallet User Interface ​59 
3.3.6. Blockchain API ​61 
3.3.7. Results ​62 
3.3.8. Hardware wallet ​62 
3.3.8.1. APDU commands and responses ​65 
3.3.9. Connector ​70 
3.3.10. Wallet User Interface ​71 
3.3.11. Blockchain API ​75 
3.3.12. Source code ​76 
4. CONCLUSION ​​77 
4.1. Future work ​77 
5. REFERENCES ​​79 
6. APPENDIX I - PAPER ​​84 
  
10 
  
  
11 
 INTRODUCTION 
Almost ten years ago Satoshi Nakamoto introduced Bitcoin to the world. His            
peer-to-peer electronic cash system allows any two willing parties to transact directly            
with each other without the need for a trusted third party [1]. Bitcoin has grown               
rapidly, giving birth to a novel industry, involving other cryptocurrencies, blockchain           
technology and new economic dynamics [6]. On september of 2018 cryptocurrencies           
had a U$ 200 billion market capitalization, of which U$ 112 billion (55%) is Bitcoin [3]. 
Despite its huge success, one could say that Nakamoto's vision is not yet             
fulfilled, as the ecosystem presents signs of centralization, especially with the rapid            
growth of third parties companies that hold and manage the user's cryptographic            
keys, in other words, the user's funds [8]. In the final months of 2017 those major                
cryptocurrency exchanges have added more than 100,000 users per day [13]. 
Many users might prefer to leave their coins on an exchange or online wallet,              
as it seems to be easier and works almost like the current online banking solution [7].                
The problem is that unlike banks, these services cannot offer any guarantees on the              
user's holdings. In fact, due to hacking, more than U$ 15 billion were lost since 2013                
[2]. Beyond that, if the users are not the real owners of their funds, the whole idea of                  
decentralization is lost, giving space to government censorship, retention of user's           
funds and other threats [14, 15]. 
For one to be the real owner of its coins, he must deal with public-key               
cryptography [7]. In the context of Bitcoin "​managing, controlling, and using           
cryptographic keys are complex tasks, and no clear solution has been proposed​" [8].             
The best solution we have so far are called hardware wallets: 
"Hardware wallets are the best balance between very high security and           
ease of use. These are little devices that are designed from the root to              
be a wallet and nothing else. No software can be installed on them,             
making them very secure against computer vulnerabilities and online         
thieves. Because they can allow backup, you can recover your funds if            
you lose the device."​ [16] 
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 The main hardware wallets on the market are the ​Ledger Nano ​, ​Trezor​,            
KeepKey and ​Digital BitBox [5]. They have limitations on the number of            
cryptocurrencies supported and a relative high price, but the main concern is that             
they still present some security flaws, like the exposure of the communication            
channel [12] and the openness to a ​Supply Chain and ​Evil Maid attacks [71]. Despite               
that, they are continuously being improved by their manufacturers. 
Considering the explosive growth of cryptocurrencies and the endless         
possibilities for a better future [17], it is necessary to give users more options to               
secure their funds and be independent of third parties. With the mentioned idea in              
mind, this academic work hopes to contribute with the cryptocurrency ecosystem by            
making a thorough description of some important aspects of managing keys and            
addresses, and also listing some important security aspects unique to Bitcoin. Not            
only that, but also to develop an open source prototype that might be a starting point                
for more robust wallets that are low cost, secure and can be adapted for different               
coins. 
We analyze different hardware wallet projects possibilities, with and without a           
dedicated screen and develop a prototype based on smart card technology, more            
specifically on ​Java Card ​, the leading platform, with more than 10 billion devices             
deployed [19, 20]. These devices are tamper resistant [26] and some of them are              
Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) certified [58]. We explore the solutions to encrypt            
the communication channel, preventing Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attacks [12] by         
using password-authenticated secure channel protocol (SRP) [27] and public key          
cryptography. 
It should be noted that our proposal is not a panacea, as it is based on                
technologies that have known flaws [18, 22, 23, 24], but are the best available for the                
price and are constantly being enhanced. Our implementation is focused on serving            
users that don't hold very large amounts of funds. For a more secure setup, users               
should use threshold cryptography [25], that in the future might be incorporated in our              
work. 
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 OBJECTIVES 
MAIN OBJECTIVE 
The goal of this work is to provide recommendations for implementing a            
secure and low cost Bitcoin hardware wallet using a smart card. 
SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES 
1. Define the requirements and features for a Bitcoin hardware wallet, analysing           
the security aspects involved; 
2. Project a general architecture for a Bitcoin hardware wallet and its           
communication protocol; 
3. Implement a working prototype of a Bitcoin hardware wallet that runs on a             
Java Card (following the ISO 7816 standard) and uses web technology. 
EXPECTED RESULTS 
As mentioned earlier, we want to contribute with the cryptocurrency ecosystem           
by providing the development community a rich description of the components           
involved in a hardware wallet project, presenting security recommendations,         
suggestions for the architecture, the communication protocol and to provide an open            
source prototype. We hope this will help Bitcoin to achieve its original goal of a               
secure and decentralized system. 
STRUCTURE OF THIS WORK 
On the ​Fundamentals chapter we make a revision on the theoretical aspects            
of cryptographic (hash functions, message authentication code, key derivation,         
asymmetric cryptography), describe the workings of the Bitcoin protocol and detail           
the protocols to generate addresses and manage wallets. Then we also review            
related works (attacks in Bitcoin wallets, secure channels and usability analysis). 
Next, on the ​Development chapter, we incrementally analyze different         
possibilities for the hardware wallet project and make specific security considerations.           
14 
 We then advance to the prototype by defining the architecture and requirements,            
concluding with the presentation of how we coded the solution. 
Finally on the ​Conclusion chapter we present the main findings and propose            
themes for future works that can be related with this project. 
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 FUNDAMENTALS 
CRYPTOGRAPHY 
In this section we make a brief explanation of the main cryptography concepts             
used by the Bitcoin protocol and especially by the ​Bitcoin Improvement Proposals            
(BIPs) related to address generation and management [28]​. 
Cryptographic Hash Functions 
A cryptographic hash function takes a variable-length block of data as input            
and returns a fixed-size value called hash [30]. Any change in the message will have               
a very high probability to produce a distinct hash, allowing to check for data integrity               
and various others applications, notably digital signatures [31]. 
To be considered secure and strong, hash functions must fill some important            
requirements [30]:  
1. To be deterministic, so the same message always produces the same hash; 
2. To be fast to compute for any given message; 
3. To be infeasible to find the original message by having only the hash             
(preimage resistant); 
4. Given message ​m1 and its hash, it is infeasible to find a message ​m2 different               
from ​m1 ​​ but with the same hash (second preimage resistant); 
5. To be infeasible to find two different messages with the same hash (strong             
collision resistant). 
SHA 
The Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) is a family of widely used hash functions             
[30] standardized by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) as            
well as the U.S. Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS). 
The SHA-1 is a 160-bit hash function which resembles the Message Digest            
Algorithm 5 (MD5) and since late 2005 was advised not be used anymore, in flavor of                
the SHA-2 variants [30], which has some similar characteristics to its predecessor,            
but has different block sizes, known as SHA-256 and SHA-512, with 32-bit and 64-bit              
16 
 words, respectively. There are truncated versions of each standard, known as           
SHA-224, SHA-384, SHA-512/224 and SHA-512/256. The newest version is called          
SHA-3 (formerly Keccak), released in 2015 after a public competition among           
non-NSA designers. It supports the same hash lengths as SHA-2, but its internal             
structure differs largely from the rest of the SHA family. It is not meant to replace                
SHA-2, but to compose the family of SHA with more robust options [29]. 
The SHA-2 mechanism is very well explained on the FIPS publications,           
however it is out of the scope of this work to detail it. What is very important to note is                    
that SHA-2 is at the heart of the Bitcoin protocol, being used for the Proof-of-work               
(PoW) algorithm as well as for generating address [1, 28], both of which will be               
detailed further ahead. 
RIPEMD 
Research and Development in Advanced Communications Technologies in        
Europe (RACE) Integrity Primitives Evaluation Message Digest (RIPEMD) is a family           
of functions based on the Message Digest Algorithm 4 (MD4), created by the             
academic community [31]. The main used variant is the RIPEMD-160, an improved            
version that generates 160 bits hashes. Currently, no successful efficient attacks           
against the hash functions are known [33]. 
HMAC 
A Message Authentication Code (MAC) algorithm has two purposes: to verify           
the integrity and the authenticity of a message. It takes as input a variable-length              
message and a shared secret key and generates an authentication code, that will be              
appended to the message and sent. The recipient can use the shared secret key and               
the received message to generate an authentication code and compare with the            
appended received authentication code [30]. 
In recent years, the main approach to form a MAC is to combine a              
cryptographic hash function, such as SHA-256, in some fashion with a secret key             
[30], this is known as Hash-based Message Authentication Code (HMAC). The           
security of any MAC function based on an embedded hash function depends in some              
way on the cryptographic strength of the underlying hash function. The main strength             
17 
 of HMAC is that it is proven to exist an exact relationship between the strength of the                 
embedded hash function and the strength of HMAC, so to break the HMAC, one              
would have to break the underline hash function [31]. 
MAC can also be used to generate pseudorandom numbers of fixed length.            
This is explored by the Bitcoin protocol to generate deterministic wallets [11, 34]. 
PBKDF2 
A Key Derivation Function (KDF) takes an input (usually a password or            
passphrase) and produces a secret key that can fulfil some required format, for             
example, a certain length and higher entropy. More than that, it is used to prevent               
brute force attacks, as two elements are present in the function: the use of a salt,                
avoiding the pre-computation of keys and the usage of iteration, requiring more            
computational power to execute the function [36]. 
In the year of 2000 RSA Laboratories published its Public-Key Cryptography           
Standards (PKCS) #5 (version 2.0), defining the Password-Based Key Derivation          
Function 2 (PBKDF2) [36], which is not particularly bound to any specific            
pseudorandom function and can generate keys of arbitrary sizes. 
The PBKDF2-SHA512 variant is used by the BIP-39 to create a binary seed             
from the mnemonic code [35]. 
Asymmetric cryptography  
Public-key (or asymmetric) cryptography is any cryptographic system where         
encryption and decryption are achieved by using two different keys, one public (that             
can be freely distributed) and another private (that should be kept secure) [30, 31].  
The strength of public-key cryptography comes from mathematical functions         
known as trapdoor one-way functions, which are easy to compute in one direction,             
yet the opposite (or inverse), is very hard to be computed without all the needed               
parameters. Trapdoor functions are based on problems like prime number          
factorisation, the discrete logarithm problem and elliptic curve multiplication [39]. 
Various mechanisms for asymmetric cryptography were created (e.g. RSA,         
Diffie-Hellman, DSS, Elliptic Curve), providing useful encryption services for a wide           
18 
 range of problems, though the most used are digital signatures and the establishment             
of symmetric keys used to encrypt the messages in a communication channel [31]. 
Digital signatures 
One of most important instance of public-key cryptography is digital signatures           
[31], with applications on a wide range of areas, including secure e-commerce, legal             
signing of contracts, secure software updates, online banking and Bitcoin, where a            
transaction is securely signed, allowing only the owner of the signing private key to              
spend funds associated with a referenced public key [11]. 
Digital signature is based on mathematics and provides three important          
aspects [30, 31]: 
1. Authentication: the receiver can verify that the message was created by the            
sender; 
2. Integrity: the receiver can verify that the message was not altered in transit; 
3. Non-repudiation: the sender cannot deny having sent the message. 
It is also relevant to note that it should be computationally infeasible to             
generate a valid signature for any given message without knowing the private key,             
while verifying the signature using the public key should be trivial. 
ECDSA 
Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) is based on elliptic curve           
cryptography (ECC). It is used as an alternative to RSA/DSA and other schemes for              
digitally signing messages, with the advantage that the same level of security can be              
achieved using a much smaller key size. For instance, a 256-bit elliptic curve public              
key should provide comparable security to a 3072-bit RSA public key, or a 160-bit              
private key in ECDSA compared to 1024-bit on DSA [30, 38, 39]. 
Bitcoin protocol has chosen the secp256k1 curve parameters defined in the           
Standards for Efficient Cryptography (SEC) to make all the ECDSA operations.           
Unlike the NIST curves, secp256k1's constants were selected in a predictable way,            
which significantly reduces the possibility that it might contain any kind of backdoor             
[37].  
This scheme is based on the elliptic curve ​y ​​2​​≡ ​​x ​​3​​+7 (mod p)​, defined over a              
finite prime field ​Z​​p​. The private key is a cryptographically secure random unsigned             
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 integer and the public key is a point on the curve, representing the multiplication (in               
ECC terms) of the generator point (specified on secp256k1) by the private key [39].              
Given the public key, it is unfeasible to determine the private key. This is known as                
the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP) and is basically what           
guarantees the security of ECC [31]. 
To sign a message using ECDSA, considering ​n​​ as the order of ​Z​​p​ [30]: 
1. Calculate the ​e ​​ as the hash of the message (e.g. using SHA-256); 
2. Let ​z​​ be the ​L​​n ​leftmost bits of ​e ​​, where ​L​​n​ is the bit length of the group order ​n​​; 
3. Select a cryptographically secure random integer ​k ​​ from ​[1, n-1] ​​; 
4. Calculate the curve point (​x ​​1​, ​y ​​1​) = ​k ​​ x ​G​​. 
5. Calculate ​r ​​ = ​x ​​1​ mod n ​​. If ​r = 0 ​​, go back to step 3. 
6. Calculate ​s ​​ = k ​-1​ ( ​z​​ ​+​​ ​rd​​A​) ​mod n​​. If ​s = 0 ​​ go back to step 3. 
7. The signature is the pair (​r ​​, ​s ​​). 
It is really important to choose a different cryptographically random number on            
step 3, otherwise the private key can be recovered, as the famous attack on the Sony                
PlayStation 3 has shown [40]. Another way to ensure that this integer is unique is by                
computing it with a KDF of the private key concatenated with the message. 
BITCOIN 
Bitcoin is a ​Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System ​initially developed by          
Satoshi Nakamoto in late 2008 to allow any two willing parties to transact directly with               
each other without the need for a trusted third party [1]. It is the world’s first                
decentralized cryptocurrency, with a market capitalization of U$ 112 billion,          
representing a 55% slice from the U$ 200 billion cryptocurrency space [3]. It is built               
upon cryptography and peer-to-peer (P2P) technology, has its own currency – called            
bitcoin (BTC) – that isn't bounded to any asset on the real world and is completely                
open source [41]. 
Below are summarized the main general characteristics of Bitcoin [1, 5, 42]: 
Transactions are public: ​​All Bitcoin transactions are transmitted to the          
network to be propagated to all participating nodes (each node is connected only to              
some peers, but using the network effect, all nodes will receive the transaction). The              
20 
 nodes maintain a distributed database called ​blockchain​, which is a public ledger with             
all the transactions. 
Frauds are infeasible ​​: To prevent double spending of coins and reach global            
decentralized consensus, the nodes on the network execute a ​proof-of-work          
algorithm​ based on cryptography hashing. 
Coins are secure​​: To transfer bitcoins to a recipient, one must own the             
ECDSA's private key that will sign the transaction and release the funds. 
Payment irreversible ​​: Once the owner transfer their Bitcoins, he will no           
longer have the power to retrieve them without the recipient's consent. 
Cheap and fast​​: The transactions are designed to be cheap and fast            
(disregarding the whole energetic cost to mine coins) as there is not a chain of               
intermediates between the sender and the recipient. 
Partially anonymous​​: Although all transactions are publicly known, Bitcoin         
uses addresses as pseudonyms, where the addresses are not tied to a person or              
company, but to a cryptography public key. It is possible to track and associate all the                
addresses using a serie of techniques, so the system is not completely private [7]. 
Coins are created by miners​​: The incentive for the nodes (called miners) to             
participate on the network comes from the fact that when they check the transactions              
and execute the proof-of-work algorithm before all others nodes, they are rewarded            
with freshly created bitcoins and the fees from the transactions. 
Deflationary currency​​: Although coins are created on the process of mining,           
there is a limitation of total number of coins on the specification of the protocol, only                
21 million bitcoins can be created, making Bitcoin deflationary. 
Figure 1 shows how the different concepts described are related. 
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Figure 1: General view of the Bitcoin protocol and its participants. 
From Miraje Gentilal, et al. (2017) [5] 
Blockchain and mining 
In the context of Bitcoin, the blockchain ​is the distributed database containing            
all the transactions between the users of the Bitcoin network, it is a public ledger that                
is resistant to modification [41]. Satoshi used the terms ​block and ​chain to describe              
what he calls the Timestamp Server [1], that works by grouping received transactions             
from the network into a block. This block will have a unique hash of its contents, a                 
Unix time timestamp and a reference the previous accepted block, forming a chain of              
blocks that will be propagated through the network.  
 
Figure 2: Chain of two blocks forming the blockchain. 
NAKAMOTO, Satoshi. (2008) [1] 
 
To prevent double spending of coins and other forms of misuse of the             
consensus rules, the nodes of the Bitcoin network must be able to verify the              
transactions that goes into the blockchain in a decentralized way. The solution is the              
use of a proof-of-work (PoW) system and a form of incentive to keep the nodes               
honest [1].  
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 After the transactions in a block are validated, the PoW is required to make it               
hard to modify a block of transactions and it works by requiring the node to compute                
a cryptographic challenge before commiting the block. The header of the block            
contains a random nonce, among other information. The node must calculate the            
SHA-256 digest of the header and check if the computed hash contains a determined              
number of preceding zeros, if not, the node must increment the nonce and redo the               
calculation until it fulfils the requirement. 
"Once the CPU effort has been expended to make it satisfy the            
proof-of-work, the block cannot be changed without redoing the work.          
As later blocks are chained after it, the work to change the block would              
include redoing all the blocks after it."​ [1, page 3] 
On the Bitcoin protocol, the number of zeros needed is adjusted every 2016             
valid blocks to guarantee that the average time to compute a block is 10 minutes [42]. 
When a node computes the challenge, it can retrieve a reward by generating             
new coins for itself and collecting the fees from the transactions on the block. All this                
process of validating the blocks, executing the proof-of-work and collecting rewards is            
known as ​mining ​. 
Transactions and authentication 
Bitcoin transactions represent the transfer of coins between users of the           
network. The transactions are broadcasted and miners register them on the           
blockchain if they are valid according to the Bitcoin protocol [41]. To find out how               
much bitcoin one owns, it is necessary to check all the chain of transactions relating               
to one or more bitcoin address. The transactions have a defined structure, usually             
referencing previous transactions outputs as its input and bitcoin addresses with           
corresponding values as outputs [44]. 
A scripting system is used for transactions, making the protocol more versatile,            
like allowing to lock the amount for some time or to require multiple signatures to               
release the funds. The language of the script is simple, stack-based, and processed             
from left to right. It is intentionally not Turing-complete, with no loops [45, 47]. 
Figure 3 shows the schematic relationship of transactions and public key           
cryptography. In essence, to transfer bitcoins to a recipient, one must own the             
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 ECDSA's private key that will sign the transaction and release the funds to the              
address indicated on the output. But not only that, as shown by Ken Shirriff [47],               
there are many details in the process of creating raw transactions with the correct              
signatures. 
 
Figure 3: Relation of different Bitcoin transactions. 
NAKAMOTO, Satoshi. (2008) [1] 
 
Figure 4 shows an example of a real Bitcoin transaction. The amount referred             
in the input (5.31491729 BTC) was collected from 5 addresses and was sent to 3               
different output addresses. 
 
Figure 4: Example of Bitcoin transactions with its inputs and outputs [46] 
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 KEYS MANAGEMENT, ADDRESSES AND WALLETS 
Bitcoin is rooted on the cryptography ground, meaning that users must be able             
to deal with public key cryptography in order to use the protocol [41]. Managing              
private keys is a complex task and this is one of the biggest challenges for the                
widespread adoption of Bitcoin and other blockchain solutions, as shown by Shayan            
Eskandar, et al. [8]. 
To circumvent this situation, the Bitcoin developer's community have invested          
a lot of effort to make the operations related to address generation and key              
management more simple and user-friendly. In the next topics we explain how Bitcoin             
address are generated and how ​wallets come as a rescue for the ease of managing               
user's funds. 
Bitcoin wallets 
Bitcoin wallets generally refers to the client software used to manage bitcoin            
private keys, generate addresses, forge transactions and aggregate balance         
information from the Bitcoin network. Wallet may also refer to the data structure used              
to store and manage user's keys [43], but we will sticky with the broader definition.  
Wallets comes in different formats and flavors, ranging from simple local           
storage of keys on a desktop computer, to mobile applications, dedicated hardware            
devices, paper wallets or even brain wallets [8]. All of them can be categorized as a                
hot or a ​cold ​wallet [5]. Further in this chapter we will detail both flavors, but first we                  
must understand how Bitcoin addresses works. 
Address generation 
A Bitcoin address is an identifier that represents a possible destination for a             
Bitcoin payment and it is deeply related to a set of cryptographic keys from a user, as                 
it is derived from the public key or from a series of transformations based on the                
private key [11, 43, 48, 49]. 
It contains 26-35 alphanumeric characters and can be generated at no cost by             
any user, without the need for an internet connection. Except the newer Bech32 [50]              
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 format, all addresses are case sensitive. The addresses are Base58 encoded and            
have a checksum to prevent invalid address usage [49]. 
It is important to note that unlike email address, Bitcoin addresses should not             
be used in more than one transaction [48], as this brings serious privacy and security               
risks [51]. To prevent this, all software related to address generation should enforce             
fresh generated addresses. 
There are currently three address formats in the Main network: 
● Pay To Public Key Hash (P2PKH) which begin with the number 1, eg: 
1BvBMSEYstWetqTFn5Au4m4GFg7xJaNVN2 
● Pay To Script Hash (P2SH) type starting with the number 3, eg: 
3J98t1WpEZ73CNmQviecrnyiWrnqRhWNLy 
● Bech32 type starting with bc1, eg: 
bc1qar0srrr7xfkvy5l643lydnw9re59gtzzwf5mdq 
Figure 5 shows the necessary steps to generate a Bitcoin address from a 
ECDSA public key. Note that to prevent length-extension attacks, hashes are always 
applied twice [32]. 
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Figure 5: Conversion from ECDSA public key to Bitcoin address version 1 [49] 
Deterministic generation of wallets 
The first generation of Bitcoin wallets, like the Bitcoin Core Wallet, generates            
random keys and store them on the local filesystem, encrypted by a password or not               
[8, 43]. This approach presents headaches and serious security exposure. The user            
has to constantly backup the keys to other devices and trust that the computer is not                
infected by any kind of malware and that no unauthorized person has access to it. 
To get around this situation, in the year of 2012 the BIP-32 was introduced,              
proposing a new way to generate addresses, know as Hierarchical Deterministic           
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 Wallets (HD wallets) [34]. In this kind of wallet, any number of keys can be derived                
from a single master key, called ​seed ​, forming a hierarchic tree of accounts, each              
with its public and private keys, as shown on Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6: Hierarchical Deterministic Wallets with different depths [34] 
 
This scheme has many of advantages over classic non-deterministic wallets          
[5, 11, 34, 43]: 
Easy to backup ​​: By making a backup of the seed just once, one can recreate               
the full tree of accounts at any given time.  
Independence of branches: Each child account has its own extended private           
and public key, making it possible to share just part of the tree. For example, in a                 
ecommerce site, it is possible to generate unique receiving addresses for each order             
by utilizing the extended public key the external chain of a single account. 
Organizational structure: ​​The tree structure can be given meaning, for          
example, allowing the headquarter of a business to monitor all the offices addresses             
with just one seed, but delegating control to each one of them independently. 
Fresh addresses: ​​The receiving and change addresses is always freshly          
generated, so it is never used in more than a single transaction.  
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 Audit capability: As the full chain of address can be generated using a             
extended public key, the key can be handled to external auditors to check the              
balance of a tree, for example, when a exchange needs to prove its solvency.  
As of 2018, practically all wallet client software supports HD wallets. The            
implementation details can be seen on the BIP-32 specification [34]. 
Seed phrase for recovering the master key 
Another important improvement added to wallets is the ability to use seed            
phrase for generating deterministic keys (BIP-39) [35]. A seed phrase is easier to             
handle instead of raw binary or hexadecimal representations of a wallet seed. The             
sentence can be written on paper, spoken over the telephone (not adviced) or even              
registered on resistant metal cards and locked in traditional bank safes. 
It is important to note that whomever has access to the seed phrase has full               
control over all the balance associated with the addresses derived. To mitigate the             
risk of exposing the funds, it is possible to extend the seed phrase with an additional                
password [52]. This also provides plausible deniability, because every password will           
generate a valid wallet. 
The seed phrase is generated from a random number that is converted to a              
phrase with 12, 15, 18, 21 or 24 words from a standard wordlist, allowing different               
wallet software to generate compatible seed phrases. With 12 words the generated            
entropy is 128 bits and with 24 words the entropy is 256 bits. The order of the words                  
matter and the phrase contain a checksum [35]. To make a HD wallet from a seed                
phrase, the words are used to derive a longer seed through the use of the               
key-stretching function PBKDF2 with HMAC-SHA512 [43]. 
Hot and cold wallets 
All wallets can be subdivided in two main categories: ​hot​, which is connected             
to the internet and ​cold ​, which isn't. Usually hot wallets are associated with everyday              
usage on desktop and mobile phone, providing more convenience over cold wallets,            
which were created for long-term storage of larger amounts of cryptocoins [5, 7, 10,              
41]. 
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 All the facility from using a hot wallet comes with a major price: the risk of                
losing all the funds to hackers or the third parties responsible for the wallet service               
[8]. The Bitcoin history is full of such cases, in fact more than U$ 15 billion were lost                  
since 2013 due to hacking [2]. It is important to remember that online exchanges are               
included in the category of hot wallets, despite holding most of its funds under cold               
storage, the final user is anyhow exposed to the mentioned risk. 
Cold storage comes in different forms, here are some [53]: 
Paper wallets ​​: The keys are printed or written on paper. 
Engraved in metal​​: The keys are engraved, etched, ablated or stamped in a             
piece of metal. 
Stored digitally on data devices ​​: ​​The keys are recorded on a USB drive or              
other data storage medium. 
Brainwallet​​: The seed phrase of a wallet is stored on one's own mind by              
memorizing it. 
Dedicated hardware device: ​​The keys are generated and stored in a secure            
hardware device designed from the root to be a wallet and nothing else [16]. 
We will focus on the hardware wallets, as they offer the best balance between              
very high security and ease of use. Besides storing the keys, these devices are              
capable of signing the transactions on its dedicated secure enclave, like a smart             
card, so the keys never leave the device. The main hardware wallets on the market               
are the Ledger Nano, Trezor, KeepKey and Digital BitBox [5]. All of them have a               
companion mobile or desktop application, usually are open source and support           
different cryptocoins [54]. 
Most of them have a dedicated screen and buttons, so that the user can check               
the transactions before confirming, copy the seed phrase securely and input           
additional password or other information without being exposed to malware on the            
computer that the wallet is connected [12]. 
Hardware wallets have a great track record but are not silver bullets [12, 54],              
they can be prone to hardware and software bugs, have insecure Random Number             
Generator (RNG), be exposed to a compromised production or shipping process and            
many others [54]. In this work we will approach some of this factors further ahead. 
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 A note on the Bitfi hardware wallet 
There is a new hardware wallet on the market called Bitfi, released in July of               
2018 [55]. The creators of the wallet claims that it is unhackable, because "there is               
nothing to be hacked", as the seed phrase is never stored on the device, but instead,                
it is inputted by the user when he needs to sign a transaction, derivating the private                
keys on the fly. Although the device seems not to store the keys when turned off,                
there might be some kind of exploitable aspect on the communication channel or             
some other part of the device. They recommend the users to generate the seed              
words using the Diceware method [56] and store them on their own mind. This              
approach might be interesting, but we must consider that the general advice from             
community is that one should not rely on human mind to be the only storage place of                 
such an important information [57]. As this kind of hardware wallet needs further             
investigation by the community, we will not consider this approach for our            
implementation and will focus on the requirement that the device keeps the keys on              
its secure memory. We must also take into consideration that if a greater level of               
security is required, the way to go should be threshold cryptography [25], that can be               
latter incorporated in our implementation.  
SECURE ELEMENT 
According to GlobalPlatform, a non-profit industry association focused on         
making specifications and certifications for the security field:  
"A SE is a tamper-resistant platform (typically a one chip secure           
microcontroller) capable of securely hosting applications and their        
confidential and cryptographic data (for example cryptographic keys) in         
accordance with the rules and security requirements set by         
well-identified trusted authorities." [61, page 2]  
Secure elements comes in different flavors, depending on the requirements of           
the project. They can be embedded and integrated SEs, SIM/UICC, smart microSD            
as well as pocket-sized smart cards. With the exception of ​Trezor​, the majority of the               
hardware wallets available employs a Secure Element (SE) in its design [54]. 
In this chapter we will give a brief overview of this technology.  
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 Anti-tamper and certification 
SEs are designed to be tamper resistant, not allowing an attacker to retrieve or              
modify information in the its secure memory [62]. Although it is getting harder to              
tamper with them, there are known flaws [18, 21, 22, 23, 24, 26] and different levels                
of security. However SEs still represent the best available practical solution for the             
price and are being constantly enhanced. 
Kömmerling, O. and Kuhn M. [26] distinguish four major attack categories in            
SEs:  
Microprobing can be used to access the chip surface directly, thus one can             
observe, manipulate, and interfere with the integrated circuit. 
Software attacks use the normal communication interface of the processor          
and exploit security vulnerabilities found in the protocols, cryptographic algorithms, or           
their implementation. 
Eavesdropping techniques monitor, with high time resolution, the analog         
characteristics of all supply and interface connections and any other electromagnetic           
radiation produced by the processor during normal operation. 
Fault generation techniques use abnormal environmental conditions to        
generate malfunctions in the processor that provide additional access. 
As there are many possible attacks and different ways of engineering a SE             
chip, it is hard to say that a chip is really anti-tamper or at least that the cost to                   
tamper it is too high. The solution for that comes in the form of certification from                
external auditors. There are two main certificates in this area: 
CC EAL​​: Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL), which has           
7 levels, 1 being the most basic (and therefore cheapest to implement and evaluate)              
and 7 being the most rigorous (and most expensive) [63]. The ​Ledger Nano S has a                
CC EAL5+ certification [58]. 
FIPS 140-2 ​​: An ​NIST standard with the requirements for a secure           
cryptographic module containing 4 levels of certification, being 4 the highest level of             
security ​[64] ​. 
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 Java Card 
Java Card is a platform released in 1996 to simplify the development of             
software for smart cards by offering portability and security [18, 19]. It is the leading               
platform, with more than 10 billion devices deployed [19, 20], mainly Subscriber            
Identity Module (SIM) chips for mobile phones and credit cards for the banking             
industry. Java Card products are based on the Java Card Platform specifications,            
which allows a Java Card applet to be written once and run on different smart cards                
running a virtual machine on top of its operational system (Figure 7).  
 
Figure 7: Software Stack of a Java Card [19] 
 
Palma L. and  Sousa L. highlight the main advantages of the platform: 
Easy of use ​​: Developers can focus on the application code rather then be             
concerned about hardware aspects of the smart cards. 
Security ​​: ​​Java cards employ different layers of security to guarantee the           
isolation of the applets on the card, not allowing an applet to access its neighbor               
memory and storage. 
Hardware independence ​​: Applets can be compiled once and deployed on          
different compatible cards with the targeted Java Card API version. 
Multiple applets ​​: Different applets with completely independent functionality        
can coexist on the same card. 
Compatibility ​​: Java Cards are based on the ISO 7816 international standard           
for smart cards, managed jointly by the International Organization for Standardization           
(ISO) and the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC). 
Java Card applets are developed in a tiny subset of the Java language with              
many of restrictions [66]. There is no support for char, double, float, long,             
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 multidimensional arrays, dynamic class loading, threads, object cloning and there are           
different limitations on Java core API classes. Yet many of the familiar features of a               
Java application are available: including objects, inheritance, packages, dynamic         
object creation, virtual methods, interfaces, and exceptions. The smart card vendors           
can provide additional functionality by extending the default Java Card API. 
Each applet on a card is uniquely identified by an Application ID (AID) (as              
specified in the 7816-5 ISO) and must extend the Applet abstract base class, which              
defines the methods used by the Java Card Runtime Environment (JCRE) to control             
the applet life-cycle (Figure 8). First the applet is downloaded to the card and the               
JCRE invokes the applet's static ​Applet.install() method, and the applet registers           
itself with the JCRE by invoking ​Applet.register()​. When the applet is installed and             
registered, it is in the ​unselected state, available for ​selection and ​processing ​by             
responding to custom commands. 
 
Figure 8: The Java Card Applet Life-Cycle Methods [66] 
 
APDU 
Beyond developing the application that runs on the smart card, one must            
implement an application that communicates with the applet using a card reader,            
USB interface or some wireless communication protocol [19, 22, 65, 66]. Those two             
pieces of software exchange information using the Application Protocol Data Unit           
(APDU), conforming with the ISO 7816-3 and 7816-4 (Figure 9). There are two kinds              
of APCU: ​command ​ and ​response​. 
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Figure 9: Communicating Using the Message-Passing Model [66] 
 
The command APDU is sent by the reader to the card with a mandatory 4-byte               
header with the type of the command, command and parameters (CLA, INS, P1, P2)              
(Figure 10). A response APDU is sent by the card to the reader containing from 0 to                 
65.536 bytes of data, and 2 mandatory status word bytes (SW1, SW2) (Figure 11). 
 
Figure 10: Structure of a command APDU [66] 
 
 
Figure 11: Structure of a response APDU [66] 
Global Platform 
GlobalPlatform is a non-profit association driven by over 100 member          
companies, from chip manufacturers to the communication industry [67]. The          
GlobalPlatform specifications consists of three parts [19]: 
Card​​: Defines the personalization process and standard ways for customizing          
the card after it has been issued, also providing the card issuer with tight control of                
the card and of the process of loading new applications onto it. 
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 Device​​: Also called terminal specification, focuses on the standardization of          
stand-alone payment terminals. 
System ​​: It is the latest addition to the family of specifications covering            
infrastructure, processes, and systems required to manage a multi-application card          
and its content. 
The main components include the ​Runtime Environment consisting of a          
secure multi-application card runtime; the ​GlobalPlatform API ​which provides         
services like a secure channel for communication, the verification of the cardholder            
and personalization of the card; the ​Card Manager containing the ability to perform             
application installation and selection, command dispatching, card content        
management and Personal Identification Number (PIN) support; the ​Security         
Domains ​enabling the applications of various providers to share space on a card             
without compromising the security of any particular provider. 
GPShell ​, ​GlobalPlatformPro and ​OpenSC-Tool are tools that implement the         
GlobalPlatform specification and allow the interaction with the Java Cards. 
RELATED WORK 
In this section we detail three related papers that were important for the             
development of this work and the collection of additional references. 
Low-Level Attacks in Bitcoin Wallets 
Gkaniatsou A., Arapinis M. and Kiayias A. released a paper in 2017 [12] where              
they bring to attention that the use of EAL5+ certified smart cards on a dedicated               
hardware wallet doesn't guarantee its security, as the low-level communication          
protocol can be exploited. They focus on the ​Ledger Nano S [58], by             
reverse-engineering the APDU communication protocol and mounting a series of          
MitM attacks (Table 1) to demonstrate the vulnerabilities. 
 
a. Direct wallet attacks b. Transaction attacks c. Account privacy attacks 
a.1 Access to the master 
private key; 
b.1 Tamper the payment 
amount; 
c.1 Account traceability. 
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 A.2 Access to the keypool 
encryption key; 
a.3 Unauthorised access to the 
wallet; 
A.4 Alter the wallet security 
properties. 
b.2 Tamper the payment 
address; 
b.3 Denial of service. 
 
Table 1: Attacks demonstrated by Gkaniatsou A., et al. [12] 
 
The attacks are really serious and serve as a reminder of the risks of sending               
clear text data through an insecure channel. The authors propose to secure the             
communication channel selectively, by using symmetric cryptography only on pieces          
of data that must be confidential. They suggest the use of the Password             
Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE) by Juggling protocol (j-PAKE) [59] which          
"allows bootstrapping high entropy keys from the low-entropy user’s PIN. In that way,             
we avoid storing secret data API side, ensure that fresh keys are used in each               
session and guarantee the user’s presence at that session"​ [12]. 
Their solution can be applied to any hardware wallet and will be considered in              
our implementation. 
SRP on Java Card applets 
As shown by Gkaniatsou A., et al. [12], having a secure communication            
channel is a crucial requirement for a hardware wallet device. With that in mind we               
investigated different possibilities to deploy this on a smart card and found the work              
of Hölzl, M., et al. (2015) [27] to be very enlightening. The authors design, implement               
and evaluate the use of the password-authenticated secure channel protocol (SRP)           
to protect the communication of a mobile application to a Java Card applet running              
on a smart card. 
The SRP protocol is an augmented password-authenticated key agreement         
(PAKE) protocol, specifically designed to work around existing patents. It allows one            
party (client) to demonstrate to another party (server) that he knows the password,             
without actually sending the password, nor any other information from which the            
password can be retrieved, accomplishing what is known as zero-knowledge          
password proof [60]. The authors choose SRP-6a over other possibilities because it            
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 is based on Diffie-Hellman key exchange, which is has a wider support on Java Card               
3.0, but end up also presenting the SRP-5 elliptic curve variant [27]. 
The referred work presents a really high level of detail and effort in the              
optimization of the algorithms. The resulting performance of the SRP-6a variant is            
1,600 ms on an external smart card, while the SRP-5 variant runned in 526 ms. The                
values might seem high, but it is important to note that most of the computation               
happens on the key agreement phase, which runs simultaneously with the password            
or PIN entry. 
Usability analysis on wallets  
One of the objectives of this work is to provide an implementation of a Bitcoin               
wallet, which will inevitably include a client user interface to serve as a glue between               
user's needs, the Bitcoin network and the secure hardware. Beyond our informal            
research on current wallets products, we selected an academic paper by Eskandari            
S., et al. [8] where the main wallets solutions until the year of 2015 are mapped,                
studied and compared, mainly in the point of view of usability and user experience. 
 
Table 2: A comparison of key management techniques for Bitcoin. Modified from ​Eskandari S., et al. [8] 
 
The authors elaborate a framework composed of ten security, usability and           
deployability criterias to enable direct comparison of different key management          
solutions (Table 2). Then they define four main tasks (configure, spend coins, spend             
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 coins on a secondary device, recovery of wallet) and comprehensively walkthrough           
the defined talks on six different wallet clients, evaluating the usability based on             
predefined heuristics. 
Table 2 has received an additional last line with our solution to allow             
comparison with the others proposals. As the keys are stored on a secure element,              
which cannot be tampered, we gave ​Malware Resistant a full point ( ​●​). On the              
Resistant to Physical Theft aspect, we gave our solution the half point ( ​○​) as the               
device can be stolen but no keys can be extracted. Finally, on the ​No New User                
Software we also gave our solution the half point ( ​○​), considering that the user will               
access the wallet through a web interface, but it is necessary to install the ​Connector               
(described in the development chapter) software or at least an ​extension to the web              
browser. 
Additionally, the authors conclude that ​"the metaphors and abstractions used          
in the surveyed clients are subject to misinterpretations, and that the clients do not do               
enough to support their users." [8], which is a very important indicative that in order to                
make a successful wallet solution, extra attention should be given to the user             
interface design, including the choice of texts, metaphors and additional help content.  
Paradoxically, despite being a disruptive innovation, Bitcoin borrowed        
concepts from the old financial order, like ​wallet​, that brought confusion to users, as              
these concepts actually have different meanings on the traditional system. 
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 DEVELOPMENT 
In this chapter we will effectively dive into the details of a Bitcoin hardware              
wallet project. 
A hardware wallet can be constructed in many different ways, bringing unique            
security advantages, implementation challenges and costs of production for each          
version. In the first part of this chapter, we will analyze those differences. Next, we               
advance to a discussion of security aspects of the project. Finally, we will detail the               
planning and implementation of a working prototype using Java Card and a web user              
interface to interact with the device and the Bitcoin network. 
Different possibilities for the hardware wallet 
As previously mentioned, a hardware wallet can be built in many different            
ways, as shown by some products on the market: the ​Ledger HW.1 ​[84] is a smart                
card that fits a USB port, the ​Ledger Nano S ​[58] is a version with a smart card, a                   
little monochrome screen and two buttons, the ​TREZOR Model T [85] has a little full               
color touch screen but no secure element and the ​Ledger Blue [86] has an even               
bigger screen and more powerful processor. 
As we've seen in the first chapter, it is really important that the private keys are                
kept on a secure element, making the smart card (Java Card) the basic requirement              
in our analysis. Another general precondition is the communication with an external            
computer (desktop, notebook or even an mobile phone), so the wallet can interact             
with the Bitcoin network and the user, usually through an user interface (web,             
desktop or mobile). This connection can be done with a smart card reader, an USB               
port, Near Field Communication (NFC) or even Bluetooth. We will generalize the term             
connection​ and detail when needed. This relationship is shown on Figure 12. 
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Figure 12: Relationship between the device, the user interface and the Bitcoin network.  
 
When we talk about requirements, we will list the most basic ones.            
Requirements related to more advanced security aspects, like the encryption of the            
communication channel to prevent eavesdropping and MiTM attacks, will be detailed           
further in the second part of the chapter. 
Smart Card + Connection 
This is the most primitive and cheap version of the wallet, even though it will               
be able to perform the basic requirements of a Bitcoin wallet. One should choose a               
Java Card that can perform ECC natively to gain better performance. 
 
 
Figure 13: Simple smart card with the USB smart card reader. 
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 If the Java Card doesn't have an USB interface, one must use a smart card               
reader to interact with it, making the project more expensive (Figure 13). 
 
Example ​​: NXP JCOP J3D081 EV1 
Cost​​: U$ 10 (for small quantities) 
Implementation​​: It is necessary to define all the commands available for the card, its              
different states and to develop the Java Card Applet using one specific version of the               
SDK. 
Basic requirements 
1. SETUP 
1.1. To define/change a PIN to access the device; 
1.2. To generate the initial master private key of the device using a True             
Random Number Generator (TRNG) and the seed words for recovery          
(BIP-39) ; 1
1.3. To recover a wallet by defining the master private key using the seed             
words; 
1.4. To verify that the seed words generates the master private key stored            
on the device. 
2. ADDRESS GENERATION 
2.1. To generate deterministic BIP-32 address (public/private keys). 
3. SIGN TRANSACTIONS 
3.1. To sign Bitcoin transactions using the keys of a BIP-32 path; 
3.2. To validate transaction details before signing (optional, adds more         
security). 
4. INTERACTION 
4.1. To validate the user PIN; 
4.2. To take actions based on PIN policies, like to wipe the device if the PIN               
is wrong for 5 consecutive times. 
1 The seed words should be sent to the user only once, when the seed is generated. 
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 Limitations 
Exposure of the PIN and the seed words ​​: This is the main limitation of this               
simplified version, as the user must interact with it using the screen and keyboard of               
a computer, which might be infected with viruses, keyloggers and other malware that             
can trick the user into signing a forged transaction, leak the wallet's seed words or               
the device PIN. 
User confirmation can only be done by PIN ​​: As the device has no buttons              
or touch screen, the user can only confirm to sign a transaction by entering the PIN                
on the computer device. 
Firmware update restricted​​: To update the Applet on the card, one would            
have to have access to the deployment keys configured for that card, making the              
update only possible on the manufacturer. 
Smart Card + Connection + Microcontroller 
The lack of a screen introduces a big security flaw in the wallet, making it               
impractical for real world usage. As we couldn't find a smart card on the market that                
has a screen integrated and we must only use easily available parts to build our               
device, we need to make the integration with a screen ourselves. For that, we need a                
microcontroller that will be able to make the interconnection between the smart card,             
the screen, the optional buttons and the communication channels (like USB,           
Bluetooth, etc.). 
This will increase the cost of the device and make the development more             
complex, but it is an unavoidable requirement, as we cannot trust a third party device               
screen (computer, notebook or even a mobile phone with Secure Enclave). An            
example is shown on Figure 14, the​ Ledger Nano S​ hardware wallet. 
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Figure 14: Integration of the hardware components of the Ledger Nano S using a microcontroller unit 
(MCU) [71].  
 
We will need to write the code for the microcontroller, which can be done in 
many different ways, usually divided in two parts: a bootloader and the firmware. As 
this microcontroller is not a secure element, it will have to authenticate itself with the 
smart card to prevent malware on the code of the microcontroller. This is a complex 
topic that we will discuss on the Security Considerations section, further in this 
chapter. An important point for the project is that if we can find a process to validate 
that the code on the microcontroller has not been tampered with, then we can move 
some code that deal with Bitcoin transactions and address generation from the Java 
Card (which is hard to code and debug) to the firmware (which can be easier to 
program, debug and validate). 
Smart Card + Connection + Microcontroller + Buttons + Screen 
This configuration is the most common among the hardware wallets, as it            
allows one to safely store the private keys on the secure element and to offer a                
trusted screen and buttons. 
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Figure 15: Example of a bitcoin wallet asking for the confirmation before sending bitcoins. 
 
The screen will be used to show important information for the user, for             
example the destination address and amount of a transaction that it is going to sign               
(see Figure 15), the seed words on the first setup, etc. 
It is recommended at least two buttons, one to confirm and the other to cancel               
operations. It is possible to include number buttons (0 to 9) to allow the user to enter                 
the PIN on the device itself or to use the screen to display random positions for the                 
numbers so the user can enter the PIN on a untrusted computer without revealing it               
(more on this on the Security Considerations chapter). 
  
Example ​​: 
- Secure Element: NXP JCOP J3D081 EV1: U$ 10 (for small quantities) 
- Microcontroller and screen: STM32F429I (includes de STM32F429ZIT6 MCU        
and a 2.4' LCD screen): U$ 20 (for small quantities) 
Cost​​: U$ 30. 
Implementation​​: Beyond developing the Applet for the Java Card, a new           
requirement is the coding of the bootloader and the firmware of the microcontroller.             
There are open source solutions that can be used as a starting point, like the one                
found on the ​micropython​ ​board ​ [69], the ​Coldcard ​[68], ​Trezor​ and ​Ledger ​wallets. 
Additional basic requirements (smart card) 
1. INTERACTION WITH THE MICROCONTROLLER 
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 1.1. To verify authenticity of the firmware; 
1.2. To establish an encrypted connection with the microcontroller        
(optional); 
1.3. To respond with the details of the transaction that it is going to be              
signed; 
1.4. To respond with random positions for PIN entry. 
Basic requirements (microcontroller) 
1. BOOTLOADER 
1.1. To load and verify the firmware code; 
1.2. To manage the memory of the microcontroller; 
1.3. To make services available to the firmware, like USB access, screen           
access, buttons access, smart card access, etc.; 
1.4. To validate itself with the smart card; 
1.5. To validate and upgrade the firmware code. 
2. FIRMWARE 
2.1. To interact with the smart card, bridging the requests from the user side             
to the smart card side; 
2.2. To display different information on the screen and deal with buttons           
interaction; 
2.3. To upgrade the smart card Applet code. 
Limitations 
Still requires the user side computer ​​: Although this version is more robust            
and complete, it requires the connection with a computer to access the Bitcoin             
Network and manage the wallet, as the processing power of the microcontroller is             
limited and the screen size is really small. 
Introduces a big challenge on the validation of the code on the            
microcontroller ​​: With the introduction of the microcontroller proxy, in addition to           
adding more code to the project, one must find a clever way to validate the code that                 
runs on the firmware, so we can prevent ​Evil Maid ​ and ​Supply Chain​ attacks. 
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 Smart Card + Connection + Powerful Microcontroller + Buttons + Big screen + Internet              
access 
If we add a bigger screen to the device, a better microcontroller and access to               
the internet through wireless connection, then we can offer the user a full experience              
with a Bitcoin wallet on the device itself, allowing a user to create and sign               
transactions, see the accounts balance and more. 
This seems like a really good option, but there is a catch: we start to open                
differente of attack vectors as the software and hardware on the device gets more              
complex and fully exposed to the internet. Because of this we will not enter in the                
details of this version, but leave it as a provocation for the reader. Maybe there is a                 
way to do it securely? 
Smart Card + Connection (NFC) + Mobile Phone 
This version is an alternative to the simplory version of just the smart card              
without any display screen or buttons. It could use NFC (that comes natively in a               
great number of smart cards) to interact with the user on the mobile phone screen.               
With the advance of the ARM’s TrustZone™, others Trusted Execution Environment           
(TEE) solutions and the concept of Trusted User interface (TUI) [70] we could             
securely display the user seed words and require confirmations on the users mobile             
phone. 
 
Figure 16: Smart card with NFC enabled and mobile phone as the interface.  
 
This solution is really appealing, as the cost can be very small and the user               
interface can be natively mobile and easy to use. 
 
47 
 Example ​​: Java Card JCOP J3D081, from NXP EV1 
Cost​​: U$ 10 (for small quantities) 
Implementation​​: Would be necessary to make some changes on the Applet to            
support sending data via NFC and to wait for the user confirmation of actions. The               
user interface on the mobile phone would also need to be developed. 
Limitations 
Need to trust the user mobile phone ​​: We must trust the user mobile phone,              
which is hard to do specially on the Android platform, where applications have more              
freedom to access the system resources without asking for specific permission. 
Security considerations 
In this section we discuss some specific security aspects of the project,            
presenting possible solutions. 
Communication channel 
As we've seen on the first chapter, it is really important to guarantee that the               
information flow is secure and encrypted, preventing MiTM attacks and its variations. 
The first solution is to use the work of Hölzl, M., et al. (2015) [27], which                
executes a password-authenticated SRP, where the password is the user's PIN. 
The second possibility is to use Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) with           
fresh public keys to establish a session shared-secret to encrypt the channel,            
ascertaining the integrity and authentication for each APDU. This solution is used by             
the ​Status Wallet​ [72]. The general steps would be as follows: 
1. The client selects the application on card and the application responds with a             
public EC key. 
2. The client sends a command to open a secure channel with its fresh session              
public key. The ECDH algorithm is used by both parties to generate a shared              
256-bit secret. 
3. The generated secret is used as an AES key to encrypt all further             
communication. Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode is used with a random IV            
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 generated for each APDU and prepended to the APDU payload. Both           
command and responses are encrypted. 
4. The client sends a command to verify that the keys are matching and thus the               
secure channel is successfully established. 
This solution will do a good job, but won't prevent a well equipped hacker to               
intercept the communication bus between the client and the smart card, listening to             
the initial exchange of public keys. 
PIN entering 
One important aspect of the hardware wallet is the PIN protection, as it will be               
required to allow the signing of transactions and even to establish a secure channel.              
In our implementation we use the ​OwnerPIN class from the Java Card API. This              
class protects against attacks based on program flow prediction and is resilient to             
side channel attacks. 
The snippet below demonstrates how to store and validated the PIN. 
// Initialize the PIN class 
OwnerPIN walletPin = new OwnerPIN(WALLET_PIN_MAX_ATTEMPTS, WALLET_PIN_MIN_SIZE); 
 
// Store a new PIN on setup the the wallet 
Util.arrayFillNonAtomic(scratch256, (short) 0, WALLET_PIN_SIZE, (byte) 0xff); 
Util.arrayCopyNonAtomic(buffer, offset, scratch256, (short) 0, walletPinSize); 
walletPin.update(scratch256, (short) 0, WALLET_PIN_SIZE); 
walletPin.resetAndUnblock(); 
 
// Check if PIN is valid 
if (buffer[ISO7816.OFFSET_LC] != walletPinSize) { 
  ISOException.throwIt(ISO7816.SW_WRONG_LENGTH); 
} 
Util.arrayFillNonAtomic(scratch256, (short)0, WALLET_PIN_SIZE, (byte)0xff); 
Util.arrayCopyNonAtomic(buffer, ISO7816.OFFSET_CDATA, scratch256, (short)0, 
walletPinSize); 
if (!walletPin.check(scratch256, (short)0, WALLET_PIN_SIZE)) { 
  if (walletPin.getTriesRemaining() == 0) { 
    reset(); 
  } 
  ISOException.throwIt(ISO7816.SW_SECURITY_STATUS_NOT_SATISFIED); 
} 
 
// Check if PIN is already validated 
if (!walletPin.isValidated()) { 
  ISOException.throwIt(ISO7816.SW_SECURITY_STATUS_NOT_SATISFIED); 
} 
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 Note that the ​reset() method is called when there is no more tries remaining,              
effectively doing a hard reset on all the variables containing sensitive information, like             
the private key, the device key and the PIN. 
Another relevant aspect of PIN entering is to try to prevent it from being              
captured by malware software on the user side. We've seen on the previous chapter              
that a device might have buttons and a screen. If it has two buttons and a screen, the                  
user might use the buttons to cycle between the numbers and enter the PIN on the                
device itself. It might even have buttons for each number or a touch screen, also               
allowing the entering on the device itself. 
In contrast, if we do not have a touch screen, we might reproduce a clever               
scheme created by ​Trezor [73] that does not expose the PIN even if the user screen                
is being captured. Each time the user must enter the PIN, the device generates a               
random position for the numbers and show them on the device screen. The user              
must look at the device and click on the dot positions shown on the user interface.                
Figure 17 shows this mechanism. 
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 Figure 17: Entering the PIN on the device without revealing it to screen recorders. 
Device personalization 
Imagine an ​Evil Maid attack where someone steals your device and replaces it             
with a replica that can send data over the internet. Next time you start your device                
(which will be the replica) you will be asked to enter the PIN, which you will do, as                  
you cannot differentiate the replica from your real device. Just after that, the replica              
will send your PIN though the internet to the attacker. Now he can use your PIN on                 
the real device and steal your funds. 
To prevent this scenario, we recommend that the hardware wallet can allow            
personalization, as show on Figure 18. If the device has a screen, a user can define                
a name or even an image for it, that will be show after the correct PIN is entered. If                   
the user enters the PIN and the device doesn't show the correct name or image, the                
user can know that his original device is stolen and quickly use the recovery seed               
words to restore the wallet on another device and transfer the funds. 
 
Figure 18: Device personalized with the name Richard and a Lion image. 
 
Another possibility is to divide the PIN in two parts. The first part (2 digits)               
would be used to show two mapped words from the BIP-39 wordlist. The user enters               
the first part of the PIN and check the words, if they differ from the usual words, the                  
device has been replaced. Note that the words are unrelated with the seed words. 
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 Plausible deniability and wipe PIN 
There is a famous hypothetical attack known as the ​5 dollars wrench ​attack,             
show in figure 19. 
 
 
Figure 19: 5 dollars wrench attack.  
 
To prevent against this kind of attack without using threshold cryptography, a            
user could have two – or more – Bitcoin wallets. One would be used to hold most of                  
the user's funds and the other would have a smaller amount of coins. If someone               
asks for the password with a ​5 dollars wrench attack, the user could inform the               
password that reveals the second account. 
This password would be an additional 25th word of the seed recovery phase.             
This word should be memorized by the user and would be asked every time the               
device is turned on. The idea is that every word entered would load a valid wallet,                
allowing the user to set up two or more accounts for his funds. This is also known as                  
plausible deniability, which can be useful different scenarios, like a government           
seizure. 
A related feature would be to allow a user to set up a ​wipe PIN, that when                 
entered would reset the device memory to random bits, making it impossible to             
restore the wallet without the seed words. 
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 Hardware level protection 
To integrate a screen and optional buttons on the device we must include a 
microcontroller into the project. This requirement brings us out of the tamper proof 
world of smart cards and puts us in a condition where we must consider the hardware 
security aspects of the microcontroller and its integration with other components. It is 
out of the scope of this work to provide details on how to protect this additional 
hardware components from attacks, nevertheless we will quickly cite some basic 
possibilities (most of them will increase the cost of the project): 
Disable debug interfaces:​​ It is a good practice to disable the Joint Test 
Action Group (JTAG) or similar interface of the integrated microcontroller if it is 
included. This will help prevent unauthorized write access to the bootloader's 
memory area. 
Active and passive intrusion detection​​: This mechanisms are found in          
some Hardware Security Modules (HSM), the idea is to continuous monitor the            
voltage, temperature, light, proximity, magnetic field and other aspects and          
acting on the detection of an anomaly, like clearing the memory associated            
with the private keys. 
Protective shield on the integrated circuit​​: Active and passive shield          
mashes can be used to protect the probing of the microcontroller memory. 
Hardware potting: ​​ An optional practice is to fill the device with a solid or 
gelatinous compound, improving the resistance to shock, vibration, moisture 
and corrosive agents. Usually epoxy is used. 
Dust and water resistant​​: Although not related to protection against attacks, 
it is a interesting feature to provide at least IP67  (Ingress Protection) for a 2
commercial hardware wallet, fully protecting against dust and immersion, up to 
1m depth, for 30 seconds. This will increase the lifetime of the device, 
protecting the internal hardware components. 
2 The Ingress Protection Code (IEC standard 60529) classifies and rates the degree of protection               
provided against intrusion, dust, accidental contact, and water by mechanical casings and electrical             
enclosures. The standard aims to provide users more detailed information than vague marketing terms              
such as waterproof. 
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 Attestation of genuineness 
To prevent ​Evil Maid and mainly ​Supply Chain attacks, it is an important              
feature to be able to verify the authenticity of the device. One option is to generate a                 
attestation key pair on the secure element on the manufacture process, recording the             
public key of the device on the database of the company making the device or even                
on the Bitcoin blockchain (our proposition). To check for the authenticity of the secure              
element, the user interface would send a challenge for the device to sign with the               
private attestation key, then it would check if the signature matches with the public              
key stored on the manufacturer database or the blockchain. If the device is not              
genuine, the user interface would warn the user about that. 
Another aspect related to genuineness, is to check the integrity of the            
bootloader and the firmware of the microcontroller on devices that contains a screen             
and optional buttons. This is a big challenge and there seems to be no definitive               
solution. One option is to record the bootloader on a read only memory upon              
manufacturing and making it responsible for providing a writable memory space for            
the firmware, making the software updateable. The bootloader should communicate          
with the secure element and send a SHA-256 hash of a full memory read with the                
provided signature of the firmware. The secure element can then check if the             
signature matches with the manufacturer public key and the provided hash, and            
inform the bootloader about the result, that could be written to the device screen. 
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 Prototype 
As we've seen in the previous sections, a hardware wallet is a complex             
project, encompassing different software and hardware components. To go beyond          
the theoretical knowledge, we developed a functional prototype using a real smart            
card. The prototype didn't have a dedicated screen or buttons and didn't use a secure               
channel on its communication, although it checks for the attestation of the            
genuineness of the smart card. 
Overview of the architecture 
Figure 20 shows an overview of the general architecture of the project. There             
are four main pieces of software that should be written to support the full experience               
of the user with the wallet. These pieces will be detailed in the next section. 
 
 
Figure 20: Overview of the architecture of the project. 
 
The user flow would be as follows: 
1. Acquire a new device ​​: The manufacturer (the author of this work, in this             
case) will install the compiled Java Card Applet ( ​.cap format) on a new smart              
card and lock the device to prevent the installation of additional Applets. Then             
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 the manufacturer will access the smart card and ask for the public attestation             
key generated for the device upon the Applet first run ( ​install() method). This             
key will be recorded in the Bitcoin blockchain (as previously proposed). 
2. Install the Connector software ​​: The user will navigate to the wallet website            
and be asked to install the ​Connector​ software. 
3. Access the wallet web interface ​​: After installing the ​Connector​, the user will            
be able to access the smart card and proceed with the wallet setup. In this               
step the wallet user interface will check if the device is genuine. 
4. Setup or recovery wallet's accounts ​​: As the wallet has no account           
configured, the user will be asked to setup a new account (where he will asked               
to write down the new seed words) or recovery using previous generated            
backup seed words. Here he will also define a PIN to access the wallet. 
5. Sees the balance and history of transactions: After entering the correct           
PIN, the user will be able to see all the transactions that happened in the               
account and the current balance. The interface will interact with the Bitcoin            
network and the smart card (asking for addresses), following the BIP-44           
account discovery protocol [74]. 
6. Generate new receiving addresses: If the user wants to receive new funds            
from someone else, he can generate a fresh address. 
7. Transfer funds to other addresses: The user can also send Bitcoins to other             
users, by defining the amount and destination address. The transaction will be            
generated and sent to the smart card to be signed after the correct PIN              
entering. The signed transaction can then be propagated to the Bitcoin           
network by the web interface. 
 
To accommodate this flow we must define the detailed requirements for each            
of the four main components, which is done in the next section. 
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 Main requirements 
Hardware wallet 
The main basic requirements of the wallet were defined in the start of this              
chapter. In addition to that, we will need to generate the attestation keys upon              
installation and to sign requests for attestation validation. 
 
1. SETUP 
1.1. To define the PIN to access the device; 
1.2. To change the PIN; ​(PIN required) 
1.3. To generate the initial master private key of the device using a TRNG             
and the seed words for recovery (BIP-39) ; ​(PIN required) 3
1.4. To recover a wallet by defining the master private key using the seed             
words; ​(PIN required) 
1.5. To verify that the seed words generates the master private key stored            
on the device; ​(PIN required) 
1.6. To generate the attestation of genuineness keys using a TRNG. 
2. ADDRESS GENERATION 
2.1. To generate deterministic BIP-32 address (public/private keys). ​(PIN        
required) 
3. SIGN TRANSACTIONS 
3.1. To sign Bitcoin transactions using the keys of a BIP-32 path; ​(PIN required) 
4. INTERACTION 
4.1. To validate the user PIN; 
4.2. To take actions based on PIN policies, like to erase the device if the              
PIN is wrong for 5 consecutive times; 
4.3. To sign a challenge (SHA-256 hash) with the genuineness private key; 
4.4. To respond with the genuineness public key of the device; 
4.5. To erase the device if request by the user. ​(PIN required) 
3 The seed words should be sent to the user only once, when the seed is generated. 
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 Connector 
The user interface will be served as a web site on the user's browser. We               
must find a way to allow the browser to access the smart card. In order to                
communicate with an USB device (in our case the smart card reader), we have three               
options: use the ​WebUSB API [75], write an extension to ​Chrome or ​Firefox or use a                
custom piece of software, which is our choice. 
We will develop a middleware called ​Connector that will make the bridge            
between the USB smart card reader and the browser, by making it run a local web                
server on the client computer. This software will have to be installed, but it offers a                
more generic solution that can later receive new features, like establishing a secure             
channel, simulate a smart card or to serve a desktop interface. 
Table 3 shows the HTTP commands that should be supported by the            
Connector ​API. All requests uses HTTP ​POST and return JavaScript Object Notation            
(JSON ​) ​ responses. 
 
url method parameters result type description 
/ping   "knox" Returns the string "PONG" 
/list  
 
 Array<{​path​: string, 
session​: string | 
null}> 
Lists devices. If ​session is null, nobody else        
is using the device; if it is string, it identifies          
who is using it. 
/lock/PATH 
 
PATH​: path of 
device 
{​session​: string} Locks the device at ​PATH​. 
/unlock/SESSION SESSION​: session 
to unlock 
{} Unlocks the device with the given session. 
/call/SESSION 
 
SESSION​: session 
to call 
 
request body: the 
command 
{response: string} Sends a command to the device and returns        
the answer. 
Table 3: API specification of the ​Connector ​ component. 
Wallet User Interface 
As mentioned, this will be a web interface running on any modern browser. It              
will support the steps 2 to 7 from the architecture view section. It will interact with the                 
Bitcoin network through the ​Blockchain ​API ​and with the device through the            
Connector API. Figure 21 shows the main actions that the interface should support in              
a workflow format. 
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Figure 21: Workflow of navigation on the wallet user interface. 
 
Figue 22 shows the workflow for setting up a new device.  
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Figure 22: Workflow to setup a new device. 
Blockchain API 
The wallet web interface needs a way to communicate with the Bitcoin            
network. More than that, it needs a mechanism to quickly gather information about an              
address, like the transactions associated with it and the current balance. Given the             
actual Bitcoin's blockchain size of 173GB [76], this isn't an easy task. 
The Blockchain API component should provide an Representational State         
Transfer (REST) HTTP interface with different endpoints that will be used by the web              
user interface. This Blockchain API should be served in fixed web domains and be              
maintained by the wallet manufacturer. In a real product there should be at least 2               
completely independent deployments of this service (in different world regions) to           
provide additional redundancy. 
We will use a widely adopted open source solution called ​Insight-API​,           
maintained by ​BitPay [77]. Table 4 shows some of the endpoints available and Figure              
23 an API response in JSON format. 
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 url method description 
/insight-api/txs/?address=ADDR Returns all the transactions related to an address 
/insight-api/addr/[:addr] Returns the details about an address, like the total balance. 
/insight-api/tx/[:txid] Returns the details about a transaction. 
/insight-api/utils/estimatefee[
?nbBlocks=2] 
Returns the estimated fee required to make the transaction be included in the             
next ​nbBlocks​. 
/insight-api/tx/send Broadcasts a transaction to the Bitcoin network. 
Table 4: Some endpoints available on the Blockchain (Insight) API.  
 
{ 
  "addrStr": "1FhNPRh1TxVidoKkWFEpdmK5RXw9vG1KUb", 
  "balance": 5.0, 
  "balanceSat": 5000000000, 
  "totalReceived": 55.86, 
  "totalReceivedSat": 5586000000, 
  "totalSent": 50.86, 
  "totalSentSat": 5586000000, 
  "unconfirmedBalance": 0, 
  "unconfirmedBalanceSat": 0, 
  "unconfirmedTxApperances": 0, 
  "txApperances": 4 
} 
Figure 23: JSON API response of an address endpoint.  
Results 
Hardware wallet 
As the secure element we selected the NXP J3D081 EV1 smart card. It is a               
contact and contactless interface Java Card 3.0.1 running on Global Platform 2.2.1            
with 80K of EEPROM. Table 5 shows the full specification. 
 
Feature Details 
EEMemory 80KB 
Javacard version 3.0.1 
CC certification  
CC EAL 
6+ 
Gobal Platform version 2.2.1 
Delegate Management Yes 
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 DES/3DES (bit) 56/112/168 
AES (bit) 256 
RSA (bit) 2048 
SHA (bit) 512 
MD5 Yes 
ECC Yes 
SSCD Type3 CC EAL Yes 
Flex with Plus (incl.Classic)  
and Desfire EV1 
Yes 
Table 5: Full specification of the J3D081 Java Card [78]. 
 
To load the Applet into the smart card we used the ​GlobalPlatform Pro [79]. In               
addition to that, we used a library called ​jCardSim [80] to simulate a smart card,               
making the development phase faster, as the simulator can be integrated in the unit              
tests. Our implementation was based on previous work by ​Ledger [58],           
SatoChipApplet ​[81], ​Status Wallet ​[83], ​IsoApplet ​[82]. 
We used unit tests to guarantee that the Applet is behaving according to the              
specification in the simulator and on the real card. The tests also helped us to map                
the command flow between the ​Connector and the smart card. Figure 24 shows the              
result of the tests running: 
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Figure 24: Unit tests running on the Applet. 
 
At the manufacturer the Applet is ​installed and the ​setup method is called to              
put the wallet into ​normal (or ​development​, used for tests) mode. Then the wallet              
goes to the final user that will plug it into the smart card reader and start to use,                  
defining the PIN and ​generating the seed ​, where he will receive the recovery seed              
words (just once). After that the wallet is ready to be used. If it is erased or the PIN is                    
entered incorrectly more than 5 times, the wallet clears the memory and returns to              
the setup state. Figure 25 shows this flow. 
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Figure 25: Possible states of the Applet. 
APDU commands and responses 
It was necessary to define and code the full list of commands and responses              
that the Applet should support. We followed the ISO 7816 as much as we could. The                
specification is shown in this subsection. 
 
INSTALL 
This is the first command to be called (only once). It will initialize the Applet instance                
and generate and the genuineness key. 
CLA INS P1 P2 Lc Data Le 
80 E6 00 00 00 -- 00 
 
SETUP 
This is the second command to be called, it will setup the wallet. If the mode is                 
development, the BIP-39 seed and PIN must be provided (this mode is used for unit               
testing and debugging). 
CLA INS P1 P2 Lc Data Le 
64 
 E0 22 00 00 var 
Mode: 0x01 normal, 0x08 development 
bitcoinNetworkKeyVersion: 1 byte 
bitcoinNetworkKeyVersionP2SH: 1 byte 
PIN length: from 0x04 up to 0x20 
PIN: var 
BIP-39 Seed: 64 bytes 
00 
 
Response data SW 1, 2 
- 
Setup already done or mode is development and seed/PIN is not provided: 
SW_CONDITIONS_NOT_SATISFIED 
Mode, seed or PIN invalid: SW_DATA_INVALID 
 
CHANGE_PIN 
This is called to set or change the the wallet PIN. The verify method must be called                 
again after change. 
CLA INS P1 P2 Lc Data Le 
E0 4B 00 00 var PIN length: from 0x04 up to 0x20 PIN: var 00 
 
Response data SW 1, 2 
- 
Setup not done or old PIN is not entered correctly: 
SW_CONDITIONS_NOT_SATISFIED 
New PIN not provided: SW_DATA_INVALID 
 
PREPARE_SEED 
This is called to generate a new random BIP-39 seed recovery words, that will be               
used by the client to generate the BIP-39 seed that should be set on this command. If                 
the client already has the backup seed words, they can be set here, skipping the first                
step. It can only be called once with the final BIP-39 seed. When generating the               
words, the data returned is actually a sequence of 16-bit big-endian integers with             
values ranging from 0 to 2047. 
CLA INS P1 P2 Lc Data Le 
E0 4C 00: generate random words 80: set the wallet seed 00 var 
If P1 is 80: 
BIP-39 seed: 64 bytes var 
 
Response data SW 1, 2 
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 The seed words indexes (If 
P1 is 00): var 
Seed already set or PIN not set/checked: 
SW_CONDITIONS_NOT_SATISFIED 
Seed invalid: SW_DATA_INVALID 
 
VALIDATE_SEED_BACKUP 
This is called to check if the user recovery seed words match the seed generated on                
the device. 
CLA INS P1 P2 Lc Data Le 
E0 52 00 00 var BIP-39 Seed: 64 bytes var 
 
Response data SW 1, 2 
- 
Seed not set or PIN not set/checked: 
SW_CONDITIONS_NOT_SATISFIED 
Seed does not match: SW_DATA_INVALID 
 
VERIFY_PIN 
This command is used to unlock the device using the PIN or to check the remaining                
attempts. After 5 invalid PIN submitted in a row, the device data is erased. 
CLA INS P1 P2 Lc Data Le 
E0 22 
00 : verify PIN 
80 : get remaining 
attempts 
00 var PIN 00 
 
Response data SW 1, 2 
- 
Pin incorrect or setup not done: SW_CONDITIONS_NOT_SATISFIED 
Pin length invalid: SW_WRONG_LENGTH 
Remaining attempts: 1 byte 
 
GET_GENUINENESS_KEY 
This is called to get the genuineness public key. 
CLA INS P1 P2 Lc Data Le 
E0 4D 00 00 00 - var 
 
Response data SW 1, 2 
Uncompressed genuineness public key (EC): 65 bytes - 
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PROVE_GENUINENESS 
This is called to check the genuineness of the device, by asking it to sign a challenge. 
CLA INS P1 P2 Lc Data Le 
E0 4F 00 00 20 Challenge: 32 bytes random challenge to be signed var 
 
Response data SW 1, 2 
The signed challenge: var Challenge length invalid: SW_WRONG_LENGTH 
 
GET_FIRMWARE_VERSION 
This will return the version of the Applet running on the device. 
CLA INS P1 P2 Lc Data Le 
E0 C4 00 00 00 - 03 
 
Response data SW 1, 2 
Firmware major version: 1 byte 
Firmware minor version: 1 byte 
Firmware patch version: 1 byte 
- 
 
GET_STATE 
This will return the current state of the device (reference on Figure 24). 
CLA INS P1 P2 Lc Data Le 
E0 56 00 00 00 - 01 
 
Response data SW 1, 2 
Device state: 1 byte 
    STATE_INSTALLED = 0x00 
    STATE_SETUP_DONE = 0x11 
    STATE_PIN_SET = 0x22 
    STATE_READY = 0x33 
- 
 
CHANGE_NETWORK 
This is called to change the Bitcoin network parameters. 
CLA INS P1 P2 Lc Data Le 
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 E0 50 00 00 02 bitcoinNetworkKeyVersion: 1 byte bitcoinNetworkKeyVersionP2SH: 1 byte 00 
 
Response data SW 1, 2 
- - 
 
ERASE 
This will erase the device memory. 
CLA INS P1 P2 Lc Data Le 
E0 58 00 00 00 - 00 
 
Response data SW 1, 2 
- PIN not set/checked: SW_CONDITIONS_NOT_SATISFIED 
 
GET_PUBLIC_KEY 
This is called to get the EC public key of a BIP-32 path. 
CLA INS P1 P2 Lc Data Le 
E0 40 00 00 var 
Number of BIP-32 derivations (max 10): 1 byte 
First derivation index (big endian): 4 bytes 
... 
Last derivation index (big endian): 4 bytes 
var 
 
Response data SW 1, 2 
Public Key length: 1 byte 
Uncompressed public key (EC): var 
Base58 bitcoin address length: 1 byte 
Base58 encoded bitcoin address: var 
BIP-32 Chain code: 32 bytes 
PIN not set/checked: 
SW_CONDITIONS_NOT_SATISFIED 
Path params invalid: SW_DATA_INVALID 
 
SIGN_TRANSACTION 
This is called to sign a bitcoin transaction using the public key derived from a BIP-32                
path. It will actually sign the 32 bytes SHA256 double hash for the transaction, that               
should be prepared outside. 
CLA INS P1 P2 Lc Data Le 
E0 54 00 : prepare message 80 : sign message 00 var 
Number of BIP-32 derivations    
(max 10): 1 byte var 
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 First derivation index (big    
endian): 4 bytes 
... 
Last derivation index (big    
endian): 4 bytes 
Hash: 32 bytes hash to be      
signed 
 
Response data SW 1, 2 
The signed hash: var Path params invalid: SW_DATA_INVALID Hash length invalid: SW_WRONG_LENGTH 
 
Connector 
This component starts a local HTTP server on port 28281 and listens to calls              
made from whitelisted domains or localhost. Java 1.8 was used for listening and             
responding to HTTP requests. The interaction with the smartcard was done using            
pcsc​ and direct access to the simulator. 
The Connector is a simple proxy, it reads commands sent from the web user              
interface, send to the smart card and send back the response. We designed an              
abstract ​Transport class and an concrete implementation called ​TransportUsb that          
actually interacts with the smart card reader. Figure 26 shows the server running and              
intercepting commands on the debug mode. 
 
Figure 26: ​Connector​ running on localhost. 
 
A class called ​SecureDevice was coded to abstract the interaction with the            
device, offering high level methods that can be used with different transports, like the              
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 TransportUsb or the ​TransportHTTP (which is used by the web user interface to             
communicate with the ​Connector​). This class can be used on the ​Nodejs context or              
on the browser. The methods supported are shown on Figure 27. 
 
Figure 27: ​Methods supported by the SecureDevice class. 
 
On a real product context, we would package the ​Connector into an software             
installer that would install and run the program as a background task upon the              
initialization of the operational system. 
Wallet User Interface 
The interface is a Single Page Application (SPA) developed using a modern            
set of web libraries: 
● React​ to define the components and its behaviours; 
● MobX​ for state management of the application; 
● Material-ui​ for the Material Design components; 
● Webpack​ for bundling the assets; 
● Yarn ​ for dependence management; 
● Jest​ for running the unit and integration tests. 
Before implementing the components, mockups of the interface were drawn          
using the workflow of the requirements section as a reference. Figures 28 to 32              
shows some of the screens. Note on Figure 29 that we try to educate the user with                 
important information regarding the seed words. Knox is the fictional name of the             
wallet. 
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Figure 28: Setup screen giving two options for the user. 
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Figure 29: Educating the user about the importance of the recovery seed words. 
 
 
Figure 30: Dashboard with two Bitcoin accounts. 
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 Figure 31: Send funds to an Bitcoin address.
 
Figure 32: Generating fresh addresses to receive funds. 
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 The user interface is easily extensible to deal with more robusts wallet            
versions, like the one with its own screen and buttons. It could also support more               
than one cryptocurrency, specially the ones compatible with the Bitcoin protocol. 
Blockchain API 
As previously mentioned, we used the ​Insight-API [77] as the Blockchain API            
component. Besides the API, we installed the ​Insight blockchain explorer​, show on            
Figure 33. On the first run of the Insight-API, it will connect to Bitcoin nodes and start                 
to download and sync the blockchain data, which can take a few hours to complete.               
After that, the url endpoints are fully accessible. To download and start the             
component, one should run the commands bellow: 
 
npm install -g bitcore@latest 
bitcore create mynode 
cd mynode 
bitcore install insight-api 
bitcore install insight-ui 
bitcore start 
 
 
Figure 33: ​Insight​ blockchain explorer fully synced. 
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 Source code 
The source code of this project is publicly available at GitHub on the following              
repository: ​https://github.com/ricardovf/knox-wallet​. Be advised that this project is        
only a prototype and isn't ready to be used in a real product. 
Our Java Card Applet was based on open source code. We register our             
gratitude for the authors of the following projects: 
1. Ledger Java Card Applet [58] 
2. Status Wallet [83] 
3. SatoChipApplet [81] 
4. IsoApplet [82] 
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 CONCLUSION 
In this academic work we explored the exciting and novel world of Bitcoin,             
focusing on the problem of storing the user's private keys that give access to the               
funds, while providing the best balance between very high security, ease of use and              
independence of third parties, fulfilling Satoshi Nakamoto's vision of a decentralized           
peer-to-peer electronic cash system. 
After making a review on cryptography used on Bitcoin, the Bitcoin protocol            
and secure elements, we dived into the project of hardware wallets, discussing            
different requirements and ways to construct a device. The device uses an anti             
tamper Java Card to store the private keys. We considered variations of the device,              
one with a dedicated touchscreen and another with NFC to integrate with a mobile              
phone. We analyzed security aspects of the project, made recommendations and           
described some challenges. Finally, we implemented our own open source prototype,           
showing the architecture of the project, its components, the requirements, the APDU            
communication protocol and the results. 
The prototype constructed is limited in contrast to the more complete versions            
discussed, with a dedicated screen and an encrypted communication channel, but it            
can be further developed to accommodate the full requirements and be deployed into             
the world as a complete product. 
Hardware wallets projects are complex, involving integrated circuits and         
software that must communicate and integrate securely, considering different attack          
vectors, without letting out the importance of the final cost and usability.            
Nevertheless, we must constantly encourage the enhancement of the current          
solutions and develop novel approaches, making cryptocurrencies a practical         
everyday solution to contrast with the traditional financial system. 
Future work 
As we concluded, the project of a real, secure and fully functional hardware             
wallet is very complex, embracing topics in different areas of computer science. We             
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 believe there is a rich set of possibilities for future work related to this project, most of                 
them on the practical side of extending and validating the security of the wallet: 
1. Build prototype of the wallet with an integrated touchscreen; 
2. Build a prototype using a contactless smart card (NFC) and a mobile phone as              
the device screen; 
3. Systematically attack the wallet to find vulnerabilities and propose corrections; 
4. Run usability test with real users to improve the wallet friendliness; 
5. Implement the support for multiple cryptocurrencies, including ones not directly          
derived from Bitcoin Core; 
6. Implement the support for multisignature scheme; 
7. Find solutions to securely guarantee the genuineness of the integrated          
microcontroller; 
8. To write an updated book on Java Card development utilizing open source            
libraries and tools, as the materials on the topic are very fragmented and             
diffuse. 
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Abstract. On the Bitcoin peer-to-peer electronic cash system the user's funds                     
are protected by private keys that must be kept safe. In this work we made a                               
review on cryptography, the Bitcoin protocol and secure elements, then we                     
dived into the project of hardware wallets, discussing different requirements                   
and ways to construct one. Our proposed device uses an anti-tamper Java                       
Card to store the private keys. We considered variations of the device, one                         
with a dedicated touchscreen and another with NFC to integrate with a mobile                         
phone. We analyzed security aspects of the project, made recommendations                   
and described some challenges. Finally, we implemented our own open source                     
prototype, showing the architecture of the project, its components, the                   
requirements, the APDU communication protocol and the results. 
1. Introduction 
Bitcoin is a peer-to-peer electronic cash system that allows any two willing parties to                           
transact directly with each other without the need for a trusted third party [1]. Bitcoin                             
has grown rapidly, giving birth to a novel industry, involving other cryptocurrencies,                       
blockchain technology and new economic dynamics [2]. Many users might prefer to                       
leave their coins on an exchange as it seems to be easier and works almost like the                                 
current online banking solution [3]. The problem is that if the users are not the real                               
owners of their funds, the whole idea of decentralization is lost, giving space to                           
government censorship, retention of user's funds and other threats [7]. 
The viable alternative for the users is to use hardware wallets, devices that offers                           
the best balance between very high security and ease of use [23]. The main wallets on                               
the market have limitations on the number of cryptocurrencies supported and a high                         
price, but the main concern is that they still present some security flaws, like the                             
exposure of the communication channel [6] and the openness to a Supply Chain and                           
Evil Maid attacks [21]. 
In this academic work we did a thorough description of some important security                         
aspects of managing keys and Bitcoin addresses. Not only that, we developed an open                           
source prototype that might be a starting point for more robust wallets that are low cost,                               
secure and can be adapted for different coins. We analyzed different hardware wallet                         
projects possibilities, with and without a dedicated screen. We explore the solutions to                         
encrypt the communication channel, preventing Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attacks [6]                 
 by using password-authenticated secure channel protocol (SRP) [12] and public key                     
cryptography. 
2. Fundamentals 
In this chapter we make a brief explanation of the main cryptography concepts used by                             
the Bitcoin protocol. We also detail the protocol itself, explore Java Cards and related                           
works. 
2.1. Cryptography 
Cryptographic hash function takes a variable-length block of data as input and                       
returns a fixed-size value called hash [13]. Any change in the message will have a very                               
high probability to produce a distinct hash, allowing to check for data integrity and                           
various others applications, notably digital signatures [14]. They present different                   
properties: deterministic, fast to compute, preimage resistant, second preimage resistant                   
and strong collision resistant [13]. The Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) is a family of                           
widely used hash functions that is present in the Bitcoin protocol. 
Message Authentication Code (MAC) algorithm has two purposes: to verify                   
the integrity and the authenticity of a message [13]. To form a MAC one can use a                                 
cryptographic hash function, such as SHA-256, combined with a secret key, this is                         
known as Hash-based Message Authentication Code (HMAC) [13]. They also can be                       
used to generate pseudorandom numbers of fixed length, which is explored by the                         
Bitcoin protocol to generate wallets. 
Key Derivation Function (KDF) takes an input (usually a password or                     
passphrase) and produces a secret key that can fulfil some required format, for example,                           
a certain length and higher entropy. More than that, it is used to prevent brute force                               
attacks, as two elements are present in the function: the use of a salt, avoiding the                               
pre-computation of keys and the usage of iteration, requiring more computational power                       
to execute the function [16]. 
Digital Signatures are one of most important instances of public-key                   
cryptography [14], with applications on a wide range of areas, including secure                       
e-commerce, legal signing of contracts, secure software updates, online banking and                     
Bitcoin, where a transaction is securely signed, allowing only the owner of the signing                           
private key to spend funds associated with a referenced public key [5]. They present                           
three important aspects: authentication, integrity and non-repudiation. It should be                   
computationally infeasible to generate a valid signature for any given message without                       
knowing the private key, while verifying the signature using the public key should be                           
trivial. 
Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm ​​(ECDSA) is used as an alternative                     
to RSA/DSA and other schemes for digitally signing messages, with the advantage that                         
the same level of security can be achieved using a much smaller key size [13]. Bitcoin                               
protocol has chosen the secp256k1 curve parameters defined in the Standards for                       
Efficient Cryptography (SEC) to make all the ECDSA operations [17]. 
 2.2. Bitcoin 
Bitcoin is a Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System initially developed by Satoshi                     
Nakamoto in late 2008 to allow any two willing parties to transact directly with each                             
other without the need for a trusted third party [1]. All Bitcoin transactions are                           
transmitted to the network to be propagated to all participating nodes forming a                         
distributed database called blockchain. To prevent double spending of coins and reach                       
global decentralized consensus, the nodes on the network execute a proof-of-work                     
algorithm based on cryptography hashing. To transfer bitcoins to a recipient, one must                         
own the ECDSA's private key that will sign the transaction and release the funds. The                             
transactions are designed to be cheap and fast (disregarding the whole energetic cost to                           
mine coins). Bitcoin uses addresses as pseudonyms, where the addresses are not tied to                           
a person or company, but to a cryptography public key. When miners execute the                           
proof-of-work algorithm before all others nodes, they are rewarded with freshly created                       
bitcoins and the fees from the transactions. There is a limitation of total number of coins                               
on the specification of the protocol, only 21 million bitcoins can be created, making                           
Bitcoin deflationary [18]. 
2.3. Bitcoin wallets 
Bitcoin wallets generally refers to the client software used to manage bitcoin private                         
keys, generate addresses, forge transactions and aggregate balance information from the                     
Bitcoin network. Wallets comes in different formats, ranging from simple local storage                       
of keys on a desktop computer, to mobile applications, dedicated hardware devices,                       
paper wallets or even brain wallets [4]. 
The first generation of Bitcoin wallets, like the ​Bitcoin Core Wallet​, generates                       
random keys and store them on the local filesystem, encrypted by a password or not [4,                               
18]. This approach presents headaches and security exposure. The user has to constantly                         
backup the keys to other devices and trust that the computer is not infected by any kind                                 
of malware and that no unauthorized person has access to it. Hierarchical Deterministic                         
Wallets (HD wallets) [15], on the other hand, represent a better solution. In this kind of                               
wallet, any number of keys can be derived from a single master key, called seed,                             
forming a hierarchic tree of accounts, each with its public and private keys. To be able                               
to backup the wallet, the seed phrase is generated from a random number that is                             
converted to a phrase with 12, 15, 18, 21 or 24 words from a standard wordlist, allowing                                 
different wallet software to generate compatible seed phrases. With 12 words the                       
generated entropy is 128 bits and with 24 words the entropy is 256 bits. The order of the                                   
words matter and the phrase contain a checksum [24]. To make a HD wallet from a seed                                 
phrase, the words are used to derive a longer seed through the use of the key-stretching                               
function PBKDF2 with HMAC-SHA512 [18]. 
2.4. Java Card 
Secure elements (SE) are hardware parts designed to be tamper resistant, not allowing                         
an attacker to retrieve or modify information in the its secure memory [20]. They are                             
resilient to microprobing, software attacks, eavesdropping and fault generation [11].  
 Java Card is a SE platform released in 1996 to simplify the development of                           
software for smart cards by offering portability and security [8, 9]. Java Card products                           
are based on the Java Card Platform specifications, which allows a Java Card applet to                             
be written once and run on different smart cards running a virtual machine on top of its                                 
operational system. 
2.5. Related work 
Gkaniatsou A., Arapinis M. and Kiayias A. released a paper in 2017 [6] where they                             
reverse-engineer the APDU communication protocol of the ​Ledger Nano S hardware                     
wallet [19], mounting a series of attacks to demonstrate the vulnerabilities. The attacks                         
are really serious and serve as a reminder of the risks of sending clear text data through                                 
an insecure channel. 
With that in mind we investigated different possibilities to deploy a secure                       
channel on a Java Card and found the work of Hölzl, M., et al. (2015) [12]. The authors                                   
design, implement and evaluate the use of the password-authenticated secure channel                     
protocol (SRP). 
Beyond our informal research on current wallets products, we selected an                     
academic paper by Eskandari S., et al. [4] where the main wallets solutions until the                             
year of 2015 are mapped, studied and compared, mainly in the point of view of usability                               
and user experience. Table 1 show our proposal as an additional last line to allow                             
comparison with the others categories. As the keys are stored on a secure element,                           
which cannot be tampered, we gave Malware Resistant a full point (​●​). On the Resistant                             
to Physical Theft aspect, we gave our solution the half point ( ​○​) as the device can be                                 
stolen but no keys can be extracted. Finally, on the No New User Software we also gave                                 
our solution the half point (​○​), considering that the user will access the wallet through a                               
web interface, but it is necessary to install the ​Connector (described in the Development                           
chapter) software or at least an extension to the web browser. 
Table 1: A comparison of key management techniques for Bitcoin. Modified from Eskandari S., et 
al. [4] 
 
 3. Development 
In this chapter we explore different possibilities to build a hardware wallet, discuss                         
relevant aspects considerations and present our open source prototype. 
3.1. Different possibilities for the hardware wallet 
A hardware wallet can be constructed in many different ways, bringing unique security                         
advantages, implementation challenges and costs of production for each version. As we                       
have seen in the first chapter, it is really important that the private keys are kept on a                                   
secure element, making the smart card (Java Card) the basic requirement in our                         
analysis. Another general precondition is the communication with an external computer                     
(desktop, notebook or even a mobile phone), so the wallet can interact with the Bitcoin                             
network and the user. 
The most basic version does not include a screen, although it has the lowest cost.                             
To make it more secure, we must include a screen. For this we need a microcontroller                               
that will be able to make the interconnection between the smart card, the screen, the                             
optional buttons and the communication channels (like USB, Bluetooth, etc.). This will                       
increase the cost of the device and make the development more complex, but it is an                               
unavoidable requirement, as we cannot trust a third-party device. 
3.2. Security considerations 
Independent of the different constructed wallet, there are common security                   
considerations that must be taken care of: 
1. Protect the communication channel using SRP or other method; 
2. Protect the device with a PIN using the Java Card PIN SDK; 
3. Allow to enter the PIN on an untrusted device without revealing it by showing                           
the keyboard numbers in a random fashion on the device; 
4. Allow the personalization of the device to prevent ​Evil Maid​ attacks; 
5. Make it possible to use plausible deniability by allowing any PIN to generate a                           
valid wallet; 
6. Protect the hardware against attacks by disabling debug ports, monitoring the                     
components actively and passively and potting of device; 
7. Be able to verify the genuineness of the SE by recording its unique public key                             
on the Bitcoin blockchain. 
3.3. Prototype 
To go beyond the theoretical knowledge, we developed a functional prototype using a                         
real smart card (Java Card). The prototype did not have a dedicated screen or buttons                             
and did not use a secure channel on its communication, although it checks for the                             
attestation of the genuineness of the smart card. Figure 1 shows an overview of the                             
general architecture of the project. 
 
  
Figure 1: Overview of the architecture of the project. 
The secure element selected was the NXP J3D081 EV1 smart card. It is a 
contact and contactless interface Java Card 3.0.1 running on Global Platform 2.2.1 with 
80K of EEPROM. All the requirements (Figure 2) were implemented and tested with 
unit and integration tests. All the APDU commands and responses were documented.  
 
 
Figure 2: Requirements of the hardware device. 
 
Figure 3: Possible states of the Applet. 
We developed a middleware called ​Connector that makes the bridge between the                       
USB smart card reader and the browser, by making it run a local web server on the                                 
client computer. This component starts a local HTTP server on port 28281 and listens to                             
calls made from whitelisted domains or localhost. Java 1.8 was used for listening and                           
responding to HTTP requests. 
Figure 4 shows the main actions that the interface should support in a workflow                           
format. These actions were used to draw and then implement the web interface (see                           
Figure 5) as a Single Page Application (SPA). To communicate with the Bitcoin                         
blockchain we used a widely adopted open source solution called ​Insight-API ​,                     
maintained by ​BitPay ​ [22]. 
The source code of this project is publicly available at GitHub on the following                           
repository: ​https://github.com/ricardovf/knox-wallet ​. Be advised that this project is only                 
a prototype and isn't ready to be used in a real product. 
 
 
 
     
Figure 4: Workflow of navigation and setup on the wallet user interface.  
 
 
Figure 5: Setup, send funds, dashboard and receive funds screens. 
4. Conclusion 
We dived into the project of hardware wallets, discussing different requirements and                       
ways to construct a device that uses an anti-tamper Java Card to store the private keys.                               
We considered variations of the device and analyzed the security aspects of the project,                           
making recommendations and describing some challenges. Finally, we implemented our                   
own open source prototype, showing the architecture of the project, its components, the                         
requirements, the APDU communication protocol and the results. The prototype                   
constructed is limited in contrast to the more complete versions discussed, with a                         
dedicated screen and an encrypted communication channel, but it can be further                       
 developed to accommodate the full requirements and be deployed into the world as a                           
complete product. 
Hardware wallets projects are complex, involving integrated circuits and                 
software that must communicate and integrate securely, considering different attack                   
vectors, without letting out the importance of the final cost and usability. Nevertheless,                         
we must constantly encourage the enhancement of the current solutions and develop                       
novel approaches, making cryptocurrencies a practical everyday solution to contrast                   
with the traditional financial system. 
We believe there is a rich set of possibilities for future work related to this                             
project, most of them on the practical side of extending and validating the security of                             
the wallet: 
1. Build prototype of the wallet with an integrated touchscreen; 
2. Build a prototype using a contactless smart card (NFC) and a mobile phone as                           
the device screen; 
3. Systematically attack the wallet to find vulnerabilities and propose corrections; 
4. Run usability test with real users to improve the wallet friendliness; 
5. Implement the support for multiple cryptocurrencies, including ones not directly                   
derived from Bitcoin Core; 
6. Implement the support for multisignature scheme; 
7. Find solutions to securely guarantee the genuineness of the integrated                   
microcontroller; 
8. To write an updated book on Java Card development utilizing open source                       
libraries and tools, as the materials on the topic are very fragmented and diffuse. 
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